Most privacy tools shift trust from one party to another. A VPN, for example, hides your traffic from your internet provider, but the VPN company can still see it. Tor is different. By routing traffic through at least three separate servers (called relays), no single point in the chain knows both who you are and what you're accessing.

This is not a perfect guarantee. But it's a fundamentally different architecture from a VPN, and the right tool for situations where anonymity, not just privacy, matters.

• Hiding your identity from the websites you visit, they see a Tor exit node, not your IP address
• Hiding your browsing destinations from your internet provider, they can see you're using Tor, but not what you're accessing
• Reaching websites that are blocked in your country or network
• Accessing .onion sites, services that exist only within the Tor network and never route through the regular internet
• Protecting activists, journalists, and people in restrictive environments who need to communicate or publish without being identified

It does not make you anonymous if you log into accounts. If you sign into Google or social media through Tor, those services know who you are. Tor protects your IP address and routing, not your identity once you've identified yourself.

It does not protect against mistakes at the application layer. If Tor Browser allows other plugins, scripts, or applications to make network connections outside of Tor, those connections reveal your real IP. Tor Browser is hardened against this, but using a different browser through Tor is risky.

It does not hide that you're using Tor from your ISP. Your internet provider can see you're connected to the Tor network. In some environments, this alone can draw attention. Tor bridges (alternative entry points) help with this in censored environments.

It does not protect against a powerful adversary watching both ends. If someone can observe both the traffic entering the Tor network from your connection and the traffic exiting toward your destination, they may be able to correlate the two. This kind of end-to-end attack requires significant capability and is not a concern for most people.

Tor exit nodes can see unencrypted traffic. The final relay in the chain delivers your traffic to its destination. If you're visiting a site over plain HTTP rather than HTTPS, that exit node can see the content. Always use HTTPS alongside Tor.

Tor is slower than a normal connection, sometimes significantly. Traffic bouncing through multiple relays adds latency. Streaming, video calls, and large downloads are impractical on Tor for most people.

Some websites block Tor exit nodes entirely, treating them as suspicious. You may encounter CAPTCHAs or access restrictions on mainstream sites.

Tor Browser, the official way to use Tor, is hardened for anonymity and disables many features that can leak identity. This makes it less convenient than a normal browser. Resist the urge to install extensions or change settings, which can make your browser fingerprint more distinctive.

Use Tor Browser, not a regular browser configured to use Tor. Tor Browser is pre-configured to prevent the most common anonymity leaks.

Download Tor Browser only from the official site, torproject.org

If your internet provider or network blocks Tor, use a bridge. Bridges are unlisted relays that aren't easily blocked. Tor Browser can request bridges during setup.

Do not mix Tor sessions with your regular identity. Don't log into personal accounts. Don't use Tor and non-Tor browsing for the same activity in the same session.

If you need anonymity for a specific task, publishing something, researching a sensitive topic, communicating through a channel where your identity must not be known, Tor is a serious tool worth learning. For general privacy from advertisers, a VPN or better browser defaults are more practical.

How onion routing works. When you connect through Tor, your traffic is encrypted in three layers. Each relay peels off one layer of encryption to reveal only the next relay in the chain, like unwrapping nested envelopes. No relay knows both where the traffic came from and where it's going.

Onion services. Websites that run as .onion addresses operate entirely within the Tor network. Both the user and the server communicate through Tor, meaning neither needs to reveal its network location. This provides stronger anonymity for both sides than a regular website accessed through Tor.

Tor Browser's fingerprinting resistance. Standard browsers leak a lot of information about your system through screen size, fonts, plugins, and other details that can identify your browser uniquely. Tor Browser works to make all its users look the same, reducing the value of fingerprinting.

Tor and Tails. Tails is a live operating system that routes all traffic through Tor by default and leaves no trace on the computer. It's the strongest combination of Tor-based anonymity and amnesia for sensitive work.

• VPNs explained, a different tool with different tradeoffs
• Metadata, what Tor does and doesn't protect
• Threat modeling, helps clarify whether anonymity is what you actually need
• Tails, an operating system built around Tor
• Mullvad Browser, uses Tor Project technology without routing through Tor